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An Overview of the International Trade Commission and Its
Role in a Possible North American Free Trade Area
Anne E. Brunsdale*
am truly honored that this distinguished and talented group of legal
scholars has invited me to share my free advice on freer trade. Ordina-
rily, at the International Trade Commission, my colleagues and I receive
mounds of good advice from lawyers. So I am pleased to be able to take
modest advantage of this opportunity to reciprocate professionally. But
before doing so, let me make the usual disclaimer. As a member of a
collegial body that is, by design, seldom of one mind, I speak for myself
alone.
I would like to start with an historical observation. Two hundred
years ago the original thirteen American colonies formed a mosaic,
loosely joined by military necessity, but greatly separated by special com-
mercial interests. At that time, interstate commerce was as encumbered
by tariffs, quotas, and regulations as international commerce is today.
Then a remarkable thing happened in Philadelphia-some call it a mira-
cle. Fractious politicians came together and, in an ultimate act of states-
manship, wrote a constitution that became the bedrock on which our
new nation was built. A critical part of that document was the agree-
ment, viewed so skeptically at the time, to remove the turnstyles and
gates at each state border. Who can doubt the contribution that that
act-producing free interstate commerce from the Atlantic to the Pa-
cific-has made to the economic prosperity Americans enjoy today? No
one now, in 1987, views with alarm Ohio's or Florida's or Alaska's mer-
chandise trade deficit against the other forty-nine states.
The United States was North America's first free trade area. Can-
ada, following its own route, was the second. Now our two countries are
trying to become, together, the third.
The goal of the U.S.-Canadian discussions that are currently under-
way is not a full-scale economic union, but a mutually beneficial arrange-
ment that would substantially reduce barriers to trade. Many of the
proposals being put forward, by participants and academic observers
alike, would change our two countries' trade laws so as to reduce the
chances that either of us will make adverse determinations against the
other in dumping and subsidy cases. I shall not discuss such matters
here. They are now under negotiation and are more constructively left in
that forum.
* Vice Chairman, U.S. International Trade Commission.
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Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, there will always be trade
tensions between us. Indeed, tension cannot be avoided because what we
seek is some degree of economic integration combined with political and
cultural autonomy. Still, I believe the International Trade Commission
(ITC) and the Canadian Import Tribunal (the Tribunal - to avoid confu-
sion with the Court of International Trade) can work constructively in
that environment-and even help to ease the tensions. I'll present a few
ideas about that later. But first let me perform my assigned task, and
that is to describe the International Trade Commission. The better you
know us, the better you can help us determine our most useful role.
The ITC recently celebrated its seventieth anniversary. From the
beginning, we have been an independent regulatory agency. By in-
dependent, I mean that we are not directly accountable to either Con-
gress or the President; but rather we administer the trade laws as
provided in the statutes, free from outside political influences. To ensure
impartiality, no more than three of our six commissioners may be from
the same political party. Moreover, the chairman serves for only two
years and the chairman and vice chairman cannot be of the same political
party.
The ITC is one of three major federal agencies that work directly in
the field of international trade regulation. The other two are the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the Commerce De-
partment's International Trade Administration (ITA). The USTR is a
cabinet-level officer who assists the President in formulating U.S. trade
policy and negotiating agreements with our trading partners. The ITA
helps American businesses sell their products abroad, and also has a role
in administering the laws against dumped and subsidized imports. These
agencies are important players in implementing policy, and often are
asked by Congress and the President to provide advice on trade matters,
including possible changes in policy. None of them, however, has ulti-
mate decision-making authority.
That is especially true of the ITC. Congress has established very
strict standards that tightly control the ITC's activities, particularly in
Title VII and section 201 cases. Indeed, in this area of trade law, unlike
any other I can think of, Congress has prescribed in great detail and
specificity the factors that the implementing agency is obliged to con-
sider. While there is some leeway in the statutes, it would be a mistake to
assume that the ITC has much discretion in deciding what it can or
should consider when it evaluates whether the requisite standards of in-
jury and causation are satisfied in a given case.
Football metaphors are popular in government. Let me see if I can
pull one off here. If the trade laws were a football game, the President
would be the coach, the Trade Representative would be the quarterback,
and the Commerce Department would be the blockers and running
backs. I think the ITC would be the kicker. A coach doesn't have much
to do with whether a field goal is made; likewise with the President and
Vol. 12:187 1987
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the ITC's decisions. It works the other way as well. The kicker does not
have much to say about the way the game is played, and neither does the
ITC.
Basically, the ITC has two functions. First, with its staff of five hun-
dred, it is a source of expertise and knowledge on a vast array of trade
matters. The most important of its major studies are known as section
332 reports. These are requested under section 332 of the Tariff Act of
1930 by the President or Congress, or they are initiated by the ITC itself.
They can cover such narrow topics as clothespins or such broad topics as
the probable economic effects on all U.S. industries of a free trade area
with Canada. (The latter ran to nine volumes.)
The second basic function of the ITC is to administer the U.S. im-
port relief laws. There are three principal statutes that provide such pro-
tection. As I briefly review these statutes, let me ask you to keep in mind
the basic distinction in U.S. trade law between fair and unfair trade.
1. Section 337 of the TarffAct of 1930.
Starting with the unfair trade statutes, the first one I will cover is
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. In practice, almost all investiga-
tions under this section involve allegations that imported products in-
fringe intellectual property rights, such as patents, copyrights, and
trademarks.
In order for a U.S. producer to win its case in a section 337 investi-
gation, the ITC has to find three things: first, that there is an unfair act
in the importation or sale of such a product; second, that there is an
efficiently and economically operated domestic industry producing the
product; and third, that the unfair acts have the effect or tendency of
substantially injuring the domestic industry. (The ITC seems to regard
substantial injury as requiring not just infringement of a property right
but also evidence that the overall condition of the industry is deteriorat-
ing.) These three things comprise a higher standard than the corre-
sponding standard in domestic intellectual property law.
Two basic forms of relief are available under section 337- exclusion
orders, which direct the Customs Service to keep the offending goods out
of the United States, and cease-and-desist orders, which threaten firms
with fines if they sell existing inventories or continue to import such arti-
cles. Either the ITC, or the President in his review of the ITC's determi-
nation, can decline to issue such relief if either determines that it would
not be in the public interest.
2. Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930.
The second principal unfair trade statute administered by the ITC is
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930. Title VII establishes procedures for
imposing duties on dumped or subsidized imports that cause or threaten
to cause injury to a domestic industry. Dumping and subsidization are,
of course, considered "unfair" under the GATT, meaning that the im-
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porting country may impose tariffs to offset these practices without giv-
ing the exporting country the right to "compensation" in return.
Both Title VII and the GATT provide that producers are not auto-
matically entitled to protection merely on a showing that their foreign
competitors are dumping or benefiting from government subsidies.
Rather, with certain exceptions not relevant here, domestic producers
must be found to be materially injured by reason of dumped or subsi-
dized imports. If the appropriate tests are met, the importing country
can impose a tariff to offset the effects of the unfair practice.
Responsibility for conducting Title VII investigations is divided be-
tween the ITC and the Department of Commerce's ITA. In a dumping
case, the ITA determines if imports have been sold at "less than fair
value" (usually an export price which is lower than the domestic price)
and, if so, how much lower in percentage terms the prices of such goods
were than they would have been had they been fairly traded. This mea-
sure is referred to as the "dumping margin." In countervailing duty
cases, the ITA determines if a prohibited subsidy exists within the pa-
rameters of U.S. law and the GATT and, if so, the size of the subsidy as a
percentage of the sales price of the subsidized goods. This measure is
referred to as the subsidy margin.
I am pleased to report that the ITC has absolutely nothing to do
with determining the existence or size of dumping or subsidy margins.
So if you have complaints in this area, you should talk to people like
Gary Horlick, who used to head this portion of the Commerce Depart-
ment's operation.
Once the ITA has determined the margins, the ITC is responsible
for deciding whether the relevant domestic U.S. industry is materially
injured or threatened with material injury by reason of the offending im-
ports. Historically, the Commission has approached this task as a three-
step process--considering, first, what is the relevant domestic industry
(that industry which produces the "like" product); second, whether that
industry is in a state of material injury; and finally, whether there is a
sufficient causal link between the injury and the dumping or subsidiza-
tion. Establishing that link is an essential element of our analysis and
frankly, the one on which my colleagues and I most often disagree.
Title VII defines material injury as "harm which is not inconsequen-
tial, immaterial, or unimportant." While the injury analyses of different
members of the ITC vary, we generally look at levels and trends in such
things as production, shipments, capacity utilization, employment, and
profitability within the industry. If these indicators are pointed down-
ward in a significant way, we will find that the industry is materially
injured. If these indicators are not so depressed but suggest vulnerability
to injury in the future, the ITC will explore the possibility that the indus-
try is threatened with material injury.
If the Commissioners conclude that the domestic industry is materi-
Vol. 12:187 1987
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ally injured, they move on to analyze the effects of the dumped or subsi-
dized imports. It is the generally accepted view at the ITC that, in
analyzing causation under Title VII, we are prohibited from weighing
causes. In other words, the causation requirement is satisfied by a find-
ing that the unfair imports are only a cause of material injury. Still, it is
not enough that the imports cause merely some slight level of injury,
because economics teaches us that a domestic injury will almost always
be worse off with imports in the market than without. Thus, the injury
independently caused by the dumped or subsidized imports must rise to
the level of material injury.
The question of what factors should be considered in determining
causation is a controversial one at the ITC. Traditionally we have consid-
ered such factors as the market penetration of the allegedly unfair im-
ports, the size of the dumping or subsidy margin, whether the imports
are priced below the domestic product, whether domestic producers have
lost sales to imports, and whether changes in the level of imports corre-
late over time with changes in the fortunes of the domestic industry.
In cases which involve a threat of material injury, the ITC considers
the probability that the imports in question will grow in the near future.
It does this by examining such factors as the size of importers' inven-
tories, the amount of excess productive capacity in the exporting coun-
tries, and the likelihood that the exporters will expand their capacity or
divert sales from other markets to the United States.
Now, if both the ITC and the ITA reach affirmative final determina-
tions on their parts of the case, duties are automatically imposed on the
imports in question. These duties are set at levels which are equal to the
dumping and subsidy margins subsequently calculated by the ITA.
3. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.
The third principal statute administered by the ITC is section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974. Section 201 is also known as the escape clause
because it implements a GATT provision that allows countries to tempo-
rarily escape from their GATT obligations. Like Title VII, section 201
establishes the procedure for restricting imports that are causing injury
to a U.S. industry. But there is one critical difference. Whereas Title VII
provides protection against unfairly traded imports, section 201 applies
to imports that are fairly traded.
As a consequence, relief under section 201 is a much more complex
issue. The GATT specifies that trading partners adversely affected by
restrictions imposed under the escape clause are entitled to claim com-
pensation via trade concessions in other areas; and if concessions are not
obtained, those partners have the right to retaliate by imposing offsetting
restrictions against other U.S. exports. So under section 201, in order to
protect an ailing U.S. industry, it is necessary to sacrifice the interests of
other, healthier U.S. industries. These sacrifices are made either by ex-
posing the industries to greater competition from imports in the U.S.
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market or by authorizing foreign countries to deprive the industries of
overseas markets. No similar trade-off is required under Title VII.
Thus, it is not surprising that it is much harder for domestic producers to
obtain relief under section 201 than under Title VII.
The relevant standards in a section 201 case are rising imports of the
product in question, serious injury or threat of such injury to a domestic
industry, with the imports being a substantial cause. To take these stan-
dards in order, determining whether the imports have risen might sound
like a straightforward task. Nevertheless, members of the ITC disagree
on whether section 201 requires an absolute increase in the volume of
imports or merely an increase in their relative market share. I have not
yet had to take a position on this issue, so I will not comment on it
beyond observing that it only arises in cases where the overall market is
shrinking.
The serious injury standard requires a higher level of injury than the
material injury standard under Title VII. While material injury is de-
fined as injury that is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant,
serious injury is defined as an important, crippling, or mortal injury, one
having permanent or lasting consequences. The ITC examines essen-
tially the same indicators as under Title VII but requires evidence of
more significant and pervasive hardship.
Finally, if the ITC concludes that serious injury, or the threat
thereof, exists and that imports have risen, it proceeds to consider causa-
tion. Once again, the standard here-substantial cause-is stricter than
the Title VII requirement, which is a cause. Also, the ITC is required to
weigh causes under section 201. In other words, to satisfy the substantial
cause requirement, we must consider all of the factors that have contrib-
uted to an industry's injury and conclude that none is more important
than imports.
If the ITC returns an affirmative determination-a finding that the
statutory requirements are satisfied-it must then recommend a remedy
to the President. Possible remedies include tariffs, quotas, and adjust-
ment assistance to workers and firms adversely affected by the imports.
If tariffs or quotas are recommended, the ITC can, within certain limits,
recommend their amount and duration. The ITC is also free to recom-
mend that no remedy be granted.
The President has sixty days in which to decide what action, if any,
to take. In making his decision he must consider a number of factors in
addition to the ITC's recommendation, including the effect of import re-
lief on consumers, on U.S. international economic interests and on the
industry's ability to adjust to import competition. If the President adopts
a remedy different from that recommended by the ITC, Congress may
disapprove his action by joint resolution and direct him to adopt the
ITC's recommendation. The President can, of course, veto such a resolu-
tion, but then Congress can override his veto.
Vol. 12:187 1987
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Let me sum up by noting briefly that section 201 is intended to pro-
vide only temporary relief in cases where the industry is experiencing
extraordinary hardship and where the facts show that such relief will
enable the domestic industry to adjust to fair competition from imports.
As a result, the ITC conducts fewer investigations under this statute than
under section 337 and Title VII. In 1986, we completed only five section
201 investigations-wood shakes and shingles, electric shavers, metal
castings, steel arms for forklifts, and apple juice-and reached negative
determinations in the last four.
That, in a rather large nutshell, is the International Trade Commis-
sion. Why have I taken you on this long excursion? Because I believe
that a more detailed understanding of the ITC's operations will facilitate
the development of a greater feeling of confidence in our decisions.
I turn now in conclusion to specific measures that the ITC and the
Canadian Import Tribunal could take to foster cooperation on trade mat-
ters between our countries. I have three suggestions.
First, we should both try to make our decisions more predictable by
placing heavy and explicit reliance on the analytical tools provided by
economics and statistics. It seems obvious to me that if the ITC and the
Tribunal administer their respective trade laws so that the results of cases
are difficult to predict and equally difficult to understand, it will lead to a
feeling on the part of producers of each country that these laws are arbi-
trary, capricious, ad hoc, and, moreover, unduly protectionist. Sound
economic and statistical analysis, along with less reliance on anecdotal
evidence, will result in more consistent application of our trade laws and,
therefore, greater confidence in the integrity of our proceedings.
Second, we should examine and learn from each other's procedures.
I am told that our two agencies now follow vastly different procedures
when they handle cases which involve allegations of injury to the domes-
tic industry. The Tribunal does extensive field work among purchasers
of domestic and imported products; the ITC does not. The Tribunal's
hearings are like trials, with cross-examination of adverse witnesses; the
ITC's hearings are like hearings before a legislative body, with little or no
real cross-examination. In Tribunal investigations, counsel for the par-
ties have access to confidential business information; in ITC proceedings,
by contrast, respondents and their counsel have virtually no access to
confidential business information from members of the domestic
industry.
Observers can decide for themselves which procedures are better. I
do not presume to suggest that either the ITC or the Tribunal should
abandon its way of doing business. I do presume to suggest that we work
toward greater understanding, if not more common rules of practice, so
that differences in procedures will not be misconstrued as differences in
substance.
Finally, I suggest that the Tribunal and the ITC adopt a formal pro-
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gram of swapping personnel and ideas. Joint committees of the two
agencies should meet and discuss approaches to cases and other common
problems. We might exchange personnel on a regular basis. A useful
step in that direction was taken two years ago when several International
Trade Commissioners and staff members visited Ottawa and several Tri-
bunal members visited Washington.
If our agencies can build a closer professional relationship, it will
foster greater confidence in what we do. In the Canadian press I have
noted frequent expressions of impatience with the ITC's decisions; and in
the U.S. press I have noted occasional concern about the Tribunal's deci-
sions. As we work for free trade between our two nations, let us commit
ourselves to improving the clarity of our decisions and to ihcreasing pub-
lic confidence in the results of each other's work.
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